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1 Introduction  
This paper proposes a conceptual analysis of borders applied to the examination of forced 
displacement and its response from a receiving state.1 It focuses on the case of Syrian refugees in 
Iraq, a relatively small and understudied population compared to the magnitude of the Syrian 
refugee crisis in the region and the significance of internal displacement in Iraq.2  
Common notions of statehood rely on the idea that borders contain societies and politics within a 
territory over which the state has exclusive power. It is the exercise of this territorialised power that 
constitutes one of the most significant expressions of sovereignty which distinguishes modern 
statehood. (Mann 1984, Ruggie 1993)  
Yet, this essay shows that the flight of Syrian refugees to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) is the 
manifestation of dynamics more complex than how a Westphalian ideal type of statehood can 
explain. These dynamics, thus, motivate a reconceptualization of borders that account with greater 
precision for the multifaceted nature of cross-border relations and their political and social impact in 
a refugee host state.  
The border between Syria and Iraq was established almost a century ago and Iraqi and Syrian 
regimes have harshly repressed the consolidation of Kurdish identity and polities for decades. 
Nevertheless, the displacement of Syrian refugees to KRI shows that relations among Kurds are 
active across the border on multiple levels, making this a “thin border”.3 Cross-border interactions 
have become even more significant with the loss of control of the Syrian state over this area, in the 
context of a weak Iraqi state, and in conjunction with an emboldened Kurdish authority. 
The study begins with a definition of the concept of border thinness, which is then used as the 
analytical framework for a qualitative examination of the Syrian-Iraqi border, especially as concerns 
the areas populated mostly by Kurds in both countries. It then proceeds with the analysis of a set of 
semi-structured interviews with policymakers and humanitarian operators engaged in the response 
to the Syrian refugee crisis in KRI. In this way, this analysis will illustrate the ways in which a thin 
border functions under conditions of displacement. 
The study concludes by observing that representing borders as simple geographical lines fails to 
portray a reality which cannot be grasped fully through the analytical category of a territorialized 
state enclosed within elementary borders. The dynamics of displacement that have taken place since 
the beginning of the Syrian conflict call for an approach mindful of the historical development of the 
border, its multi-layered structure, and by assessing the extent to which it has a containment 
capacity of society, politics, and economies within state territory. 
Syrian displacement in KRI shows that a thin border has scarce containment capacity. Instead, the 
relations that connect the two sides of the border have established a shared space for politics, 
society, and economies. This context of transborder relations has made KRI a likely destination for 
refugees who could count on political interests, social solidarity, and economic opportunities to 
smoothen the impact of their presence in KRI. From the perspective of the host government and 
society, the thin border means that Kurdish Syrian displacement has direct political, social, and 
economic implications. In particular, the KRG political leadership could frame Syrian Kurdish 
presence into a discourse of solidarity and pan-Kurdishness that would have not been available 
otherwise. Although there have been phases of border closure and a severe selectivity towards 
certain (especially Arab) refugees; these relations made possible by border thinness have set the 
stage for a relatively receptive response towards refugees making less likely border closures, 
xenophobia, or the criminalization of migration. 
  
2 Methodology and limitations 
The author has carried out 22 technical and elite-level semi-structured interviews in KRI in April 
2017. Only some of these interviews are directly quoted in the text. All quotations in the text have 
been checked and authorized by the interviewees or their public relations offices. Furthermore, the 
author visited Syrian refugee camps in each of the three Iraqi Kurdish governorates: Erbil (Koushtapa 
Camp), Dohuk (Domiz 2 Camp) and Suleymaniyya (Arbat Camp). Apart for the case of Koushtapa 
Camp, Asayish, the internal security forces of the KRG, have constantly attempted to limit access to 
the camps to the author for reasons that could not be clarified.  Nevertheless, the UNHCR has 
eventually facilitated access and allowed the author to get a sense of the quality of life in camps, the 
kind of organizations that operate in it, and the regulations to which camp residents are subjected 
through direct observation and by speaking with camps administrators.  
In September 2017 the KRG has held a long-awaited independence referendum that unsurprisingly 
delivered a positive result. This event has brought about a series of reactions from the central 
federal government and the neighbouring countries that have undermined the quest for 
independence of the KDP and weakened the KRG. The economic situation has deteriorated 
dramatically, and protests have spread across the region against a poor democratic record and its 
problematic economic policies. These events have affected or will probably affect the Syrian Kurdish 
refugee population, but they are not accounted for in this article due to their novelty. 
Furthermore, while internal displacement in Iraq is dramatic and demographically much more 
relevant than the question of refugees this research is deliberately focussed on refugees exclusively 
and not on internally displaced persons as an acknowledged limitation of the study. 
3 Rethinking borders 
The scholarly debate on borders has been developing across several disciplines focussing on the 
redefinition of the nature, characteristics, and relevance of an important, yet understudied, 
institution shaping international politics and society. (Kolossov 2005, Mezzadra and Neilson 2012, 
Vaughan-Williams 2008, Kratochwil 1986, Migdal 2004, Agnew 2008) Much of this debate originates 
from a reflection on the relations between state and territory and invesitgates the ways in which 
statehood, and therefore sovereignty, is connected to the exercise of power over a finite geographic 
space contained by borders.  
Scholars as John Ruggie (1993) John Agnew (1994) and  Liisa Malkki (1992) have observed from 
diverse disciplinary perspectives that state territoriality is an assumption often taken for granted and 
yet deserving far more thorough scrutiny.  
Stephen Krasner’s analysis of the Westphalian model as a type of statehood observes that the 1648 
Treaty of Westphalia, conventionally identified as the historical foundation of territorial sovereignty, 
should be considered more as a reference than a historical turning point. In his view: “the 
Westphalian model has never been more than a reference point or a convention; it has never been 
some deeply confining structure from which actors could not escape.” (1995, 115) 
This is not the place to engage with this debate further; yet criticism towards assumptions of 
territorial statehood justifies a reconsideration of the concept of borders that goes beyond their 
identification as lines demarking a geographical territory. Therefore, I adapt and elaborate on a 
conceptualization of borders as multi-layered entities constituted by boundaries, to serve the 
purposes of the subsequent analysis. Following this definition originally developed by Beatrix 
Haselberger, (2014) within the discipline of Urban Planning borders are constituted by four main 
  
boundaries: political, social, economic, and natural. Whereas the term border refers to a linear 
geographical demarcation over and within which the state exercise its power; the boundary is a 
fuzzier entity enclosing areas of relations between different subcategories constitutive of the border. 
A political boundary identifies the area of relations between political actors: for example, parties or 
political movements. The social boundary demarcates a space of social relations, for example 
between ethnic groups, kinship, or social organizations as religious networks. The economic 
boundary refers to the area of economic activities such as trade, industrial areas, or agricultural 
lands. The natural boundary defines a space through natural physical elements for example rivers, 
mountains, or plains. 
By analysing the state border as constituted by a set of layers, greater complexity emerges on its 
function of delimitation of state territory. Disaggregating its boundaries throughout a method of 
“boundary analysis” allows evaluating the containment capability of the border with respect to each 
of its components. When the boundaries of a border allow for connections, exchanges, and relations 
then we have a “thin border” which has scant containment capacity. This means that the areas 
within these boundaries do not map on the territory that is identified by the border. For all kinds of 
historical circumstances, societies, economies, or politics do not always end where the edge of a 
state territory is established in the form of a border but can instead continue in the form of 
relations, cultural connections, languages or trade relations and that may render the border existent 
but thin.  
Conversely, a thick border has the capacity of separating spaces and therefore establishes 
discontinuity between people and things contained inside and outside the borders. The nature of 
the border, its containment capacity, influences the way in which transborder phenomena take 
place, and migrations are among these. 
As a working definition let us consider border thinness a set of formal and informal practices, 
allowing for a sustained flow of things and people. It is important to note that a thin border is not a 
redundant entity. The fact that it exists, e.g. in the form of customs, borderlines, or crossing points, 
still denotes a capacity by those in charge of controlling flows across territories at least as much as 
they have power to do so.  
4 The Syrian-Iraqi border as a thin border: a boundary analysis 
Given the conceptualization of borders not as simple territorial lines and considering the criticism 
that territorial conceptions of statehood have raised, an analysis of the Syrian-Iraqi border should 
consider its constitutive layers including its political, social, economic and natural boundaries. 
4.1 Political Boundary 
An assessment of the social and political dimension of the Syrian-Iraqi boundary can only begin from 
its historical formation. Iraq as a territorial entity originates from the broader regional process of 
state formation of the interwar period. At this time “the new ideological centrality of specifically 
collective structures (nationally, culturally, or economically defined) for delivering order meant that 
territorial states in the non-European world now become central to organizing the international 
sphere.” (Dodge 2003, 6) The establishment of the British Mandate administration of Mesopotamia 
(1920) entailed the designation of a unified Iraqi geographical entity, which until then was divided 
into three administrative provinces (Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra). (Tripp 2000, 29) 
In the northern and north-western areas of Mosul Province was concentrated a majority of Kurdish 
speaking population. Contextually with the rise of nationalisms in the rest of the region, Kurdish 
  
elites begun to mobilise for an independent Kurdish state, but their efforts were unsuccessful. In 
1920 the Treaty of Sèvres included a clause referring to the establishment of a Kurdish state on a 
territory unifying the areas of Turkey, the French Mandate, and the British Mandate, in which 
Kurdish languages were spoken. Opposition from Turkish nationalists and the interests of the 
Mandates’ power brought about the abolition of this clause, and the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne 
(1923) failed to mention the formation of a Kurdish state (Stansfield 2016, 47-48). Thus, populations 
speaking Kurdish languages were divided between four polities: Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq. Yet the 
struggle for Kurdish self-determination has continued until today; although its intensity, methods, 
and achievements differ from state to state.  
In 1932, the Kingdom of Iraq supplanted the British Mandate. In 1946 the Kurdish Democratic Party 
was founded by leaders including Mulla Mustafa Barzani and Jalal Talabani, and became the main 
political organisation in Iraq for Kurdish rights and self-determination. Soon, the leaders of the KDP 
were forced into exile; Barzani went to Tehran and the USA and Talabani went to Syria where he led 
the foundation of the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria (1956). (Tejel 2009, 48-49)  
Both Syria and Iraq have used Kurdish politics as a means of influence across their borders, and 
exploited the divisions on tribal, ideological, and social levels among the Kurds to restrain them.  
The Syrian regime of Hafez al-Asad pursued a policy of Arabization of the north-eastern area of Syria, 
mainly populated by Kurds (Tejel 2009, 60-62), but also used Kurdish political groups in Iraq and 
Turkey to pursue foreign policy objectives. The Kurds were instrumental to Syria’s fierce antagonism 
with the Iraqi Ba‘ath. The Patriotic Union Party (PUK), the party that split from the KDP in 1970s, 
opened its first office in Damascus in 1975 under the leadership of Talabani. According to Jordi Tejel, 
hundreds of Syrian Kurds suffering from discrimination, deportation, and the stripping of citizenship 
in their own country joined the Peshmerga forces of Iraq (Tejel 2009, 61;71).  
In a similar way, Turkey and Iran established relations with Kurdish parties to project their influence 
in Iraq and to contrast Kurdish activism within their own states. Kurdish political groups also took 
advantage of the protection and support of foreign patrons to pursue their agendas. To mention a 
few examples, Iran supplied weapons to the Peshmerga in the 70s to weaken Iraqi stances over 
border disputes; during the Iran-Iraq war the KDP established relations with Iran, while the PUK was 
initially on the Iraqi side before shifting towards Iran (Stansfield 2016, 105; 115-118). Furthermore, 
the KDP has enjoyed excellent political and economic relations with Turkey, which has allowed to 
counter the influence of rival political groups including the Kurdish Communist Party (PKK) in conflict 
with the Turkish regime (Stansfield 2016, 150). 
Both the formation of Iraq as a territorial entity and the political forces cutting across the border of 
Iraq and its neighbours, especially when it comes to the Kurdish question, are indicative of the thin 
nature of the political boundary. This boundary can hardly contain the activity of political actors 
operating in their respective states; politics does not end where the state ends, and instead the 
border constitutes a channel for influence for governments as well Kurdish groups to project power 
beyond their formal territoriality. 
4.2 Social Boundary 
Like the nature of political relations, social connections further corroborate the idea of a thin Syria-
Iraqi border. The development of the Iraqi state shows how the Syrian-Iraqi border cuts across an 
area and a population with shared social characteristics. Ethnic identity, language, religion, and 
social hierarchies, such as tribalism, constitute elements of continuity among Kurdish populations on 
both sides of the border.  
  
The literature on Kurdish identity points out that a cohesive national identity is not an uncontested 
phenomenon and internal pluralism within Kurdish society is sharp, sometimes even conflictual, as 
several wars among Kurdish factions demonstrate. (Dahlman 2002, 276, Tripp 2000, 34-36, 
Stansfield 2016, 68) Yet the rise of Kurdish nationalism has produced a progressive sense of 
cohesiveness across different languages, social, and religious groups encompassed under an idea of 
Kurdishness. Social and cultural homogeneity is particularly consistent in the Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish 
areas given their adjacency.  
Kurds from Syria (Rojava Kurds) speak a similar or identical language to the Kurds of North Western 
Iraq, usually referred to as Bahdini. Whereas most of the Kurds from Syria have received an Arabic 
education, therefore also speak Arabic, most Kurds in Iraq, especially the younger generations who 
have not served in the Iraqi Army, speak only Kurdish; although Arabic is the official second language 
in the Kurdish Region of Iraq.4 Kelsey Shanks observes how the education policy of the Kurdish 
Regional Government is informed by the intent of favouring Kurdish over Arabic in education. 
Although Arabic is taught in schools, the subject is not taught as well as Kurdish. As she observes: 
“The KRG has supported both the US and Israel, and correspondingly, English language has taken 
precedence in the KRG school curriculum. Consequently, the new generation of Iraqi Kurds within 
the KRI does not possess the same fluency in Arabic as their parents.” (Shanks 2016, 430) Perhaps 
paradoxically, when it comes to linguistic relations, Iraqi Kurds are more closely connected with 
Syrian Kurds (and the other Kurdish groups in Turkey and Iran) than with their own Arab fellow 
nationals. 
Other connections are religious and tribal social structures. Van Bruinessen highlights that the 
formation of new borders in the early twentieth century cut through tribal territories. This disrupted 
the nomadic and transhumant habits of local tribes. In addition, tribal leaders (aghas) have often let 
themselves be co-opted opportunistically by ruling authorities during the Ottoman Empire, in the 
mandate administrations, and in the new states; this has had the effect of progressively weakening 
their traditional social role. (Bruinessen 1992, 190-192)  
Notwithstanding this, tribal networks have maintained a fundamental role for smugglers of goods 
and people across borders. Van Bruinessen observes that “the new borders made smuggling an 
important source of income, and tribes appeared to be appropriate organisations to exploit it – 
because of their internal solidarity and the strong authority of the chieftain over his followers.” 
(Bruinessen 2001, 19)  
Tejel further documents how tribal groups such as the Hasenan, the Miran, and Bawlian in Syria are 
closely related to the Barzanis. These tribal groups were particularly affected by the withdrawal of 
citizenship and the establishment of the “Arab Belt” enacted by the Syrian government in their 
areas, and have tended to find better conditions of living or employment in Iraqi Kurdistan, for 
example joining the Peshmerga forces (Tejel 2009, 73). The Barzanis remain the most influential kin 
groups having acquired political leadership and surviving the decline of other tribal groups. 
According to Hamit Bozarslan “the Barzani family has never confined itself to the Iraqi state 
frontiers, it has defined them as a tribe, as a religious authority and as a nationalist entity.” 
(Bozarslan 1997) 
A third social dimension that cuts across state boundaries is religion but its influence is in decline. 
The majority of the Kurdish population is Sunni Muslim, adhering to Shafi‘i legal tradition, differing 
from most other Sunni groups in Syria, Turkey, and Iraq, who are more commonly Hanafi. Sufism and 
other mystical religious practices are diffused among the Kurds in the form of networks such as the 
Naqshabandiya and other religious hierarchies which represent the most distinctive elements of 
  
Islam in Kurdish culture. (Pinto 2010, Tejel 2009, 98-102) Yet similarly to the case of tribalism, 
religion has been identified as an archaic trait of Kurdish identity by nationalist leaders, which does 
not fit with the modernization of Kurdish identity. McDowell observes:  
For political Kurds in Turkey and elsewhere Islam was associated with traditionalists and 
conservatives, with aghas and landlords. When religious leaders entered the nationalist 
struggle as in the case of Barzinji in Iraq, they subordinated the language of religion to that 
of the national struggle. (1992, 9)  
This is a point with which van Bruinessen agrees concluding that religious leaders’ influence has 
declined contextually with the rise of Kurdish nationalism (1992, 254-255). 
Thus, the nature of the social boundary between Syria and Iraq is mixed and has changed over time. 
Religion and kinship establish a connection between both sides of the border, but the rise of 
territorial states and modernist policies of Kurdish nationalism have undermined their relevance. 
Peoples on both side of the border share common characteristics, in particular language, religion, 
and traditional social hierarchies, but of these factors only those that serve the purposes of the 
Kurdish nationalist project have maintained relevance. Smuggling constitutes an important informal 
economy5 reviving transborder tribal networks. Young Iraqi Kurds are linguistically connected with 
their Kurdish fellows across the border than with Iraqi Arabs. Language is the strongest transborder 
link, which also survived the creation of state borders thanks to education policies that reflect 
Kurdish nationalist interest.  
From the point of view of Syrian Kurds, Tejel observes that their relations with Iraqi Kurdistan has 
changed over time from inward to transregional and “it was inspired by the incontestable reality of 
the transborder character of the Kurdish question and the understanding, on the part of the Syrian 
Kurds, that the border was more a common space, in terms of language, tribal affiliation, ethnicity, 
and family, than a line of separation.” (Tejel 2009, 5) 
4.3 Economic Boundary 
The third part of this boundaries analysis concerns economic relations and questions whether the 
establishment of state borders has determined a containment of economies within state 
territorialities. The borders of the Kurdish region of Iraq are important because they are the main 
crossing point for land-transported goods as well as pipelines coming from and going towards some 
of the main trade partners of Iraq (See Figures 1, 2, 3, 4). The fact that KRI is both a destination and a 
transit region for Iraq’s trade partners makes the openness of the economic boundary a vital 
interest. An analysis of IMF trade data between neighbouring countries shows that the main trade 
partner since 2005 has been Turkey. About thirty percent of total goods imported by Iraq comes 
from Turkey (Figure 2) which makes it the second country of origin for imports, coming only after 
China.  On the other hand, Turkey plays a marginal role as destination for exports that is mostly oil. 
(Figure 4) 
Syria played a significant role as an exporter to Iraq at least until 2011, when imports of Syrian origin 
represented ten to fifteen percent of the total goods imported by Iraq and made Syria among the 
top three exporters to Iraq after Turkey and China, (Figure 2) the latter having gained influence after 
2011. Iraqi exports to Syria however have been limited.6  
These data highlight that the Kurdish region enjoys a key role due to its location between two main 
trade partners for Iraq, although in the case of Syria there are also alternative crossing points in non-
Kurdish Iraqi territory. Yet, there are limitations to be considered. The data aggregates Iraqi and 
  
Kurdish statistics. According to estimates by the World Bank, the KRI is the destination of about one 
third of the total imports from Turkey, which makes it the main trade partner of the KRG. This is not 
surprising, given the close relationship between the KDP, the KRG, and the Turkish government 
(World Bank 2015). As concerns the imports from Syria, it is less clear the extent to which they are 
concentrated in KRI, since official data is not available.  
The other limitation relates to informal economies. It was already mentioned that smuggling 
networks are considered a very important economic resource for the local population. Although 
there is no reliable data, the importance of this activity increases the considerable amount of formal 
exchange of goods across the border.  
Reviewing the phases of Kurdish economy in Iraq, Gareth Stansfield highlights how the Kurdish 
region has experienced massive destruction, especially from Hussein’s regime, but has capitalized on 
the sanction regime of the 90s.  Its transborder relations have been a crucial resource to stabilize 
and develop the Kurdish economy, primarily to the benefit of the two main political groups the PUK 
and the KDP. In this respect, Stansfield documents the importance of revenues generated by 
customs and taxation especially in the Faysh Khabour border crossing between the KRI and Turkey 
(Stansfield 2003, 51). 
Notwithstanding the approximation of data, all elements concerning the nature of the economic 
boundary of the Kurdish region denote a regime of formal and informal openness due to the 
important economic role that both Syria and especially Turkey have played in the economy of this 
region. This leads to the conclusion that the economic boundary does not have a containment 
function and facilitates transactions between trade partners and therefore can be considered thin. 
4.4 Natural Boundary 
Finally, due consideration is given to the natural boundary. A common motto in Kurdish folklore says 
that “Kurds have no friends but the mountains” (Bulloch and Morris 1992). The saying epitomizes 
the history of repression and isolation that Kurds have experienced but also refers to the geographic 
nature of the area where most Kurdish speaking populations are concentrated. Historically, the 
Kurdish population has concentrated in mountainous areas because this terrain offers defensive 
advantage. Consequently, the border of the Kurdish region with Syria, Turkey, and Iran are mostly 
characterized by a rugged orographic geography. Furthermore, the Syrian-Iraqi border in the Kurdish 
region straddles along the bed of the river Tigris. A mountainous natural boundary has a double 
effect. Whereas it is true that mountains and valleys add to the costs of infrastructures and 
transports for border facilities, an impervious geographical area renders policing more difficult, 
facilitating informal crossings and smuggling. As regards the border with Syria, in 2013 the KRG has 
built a pontoon bridge on the river Tigris (Arafat 2017a) that has connected the two shores, opening 
the way for Syrian-Iraqi crossings in the Kurdish region.  
Overall, the natural boundary of the Kurdish border may appear in contrast with an idea of boundary 
thinness. The mountainous region has constituted a source of protection for the Kurdish population 
through its containment capacity, but its natural conformation also facilitates smuggling and 
informal crossings, thus at least in part contributing to a more fluid border situation difficult to 
control by state authorities. 
Based on four boundary levels, the analysis of the border of Iraqi Kurdistan with Syria shows that the 
political, social, economic, and natural dimensions of this border generally fit the definition of a thin 
border. The intense transborder political activity, the social connections that Kurds share on the 
linguistic and cultural levels, the importance of trade with neighbours, and the nature of the terrain 
  
lead to an assessment of the border of Iraqi Kurdistan with Syria as a thin border. Instead of falling 
where the territorial border of the state is formally located, the constitutive boundaries of the 
border demarcate spaces of interaction that challenge the containment capacity of the border. 
Notwithstanding the initial project of establishing state-like polities reflecting a fully Westphalian 
character of state territorialization, this case shows that this process has only in part achieved the 
objective. Especially when it comes to the Kurdish question in Syria and in Iraq, politics, society, and 
economies do not end where borders are mapped; in conjunction with the collapse of the Syrian 
state and the crisis of Iraq, these transborder dynamics have played a greater role in shaping the 
patterns of refugee displacement as well as the response to it by the host government and society.  
5 The functioning of border thinness under circumstances of forced displacement 
Migrations and forced migrations are phenomena with which the Kurdish population is familiar, both 
at the sending and receiving ends. The history of Kurdish repression has caused cross-border and 
internal displacement on several occasions. Most recently, tens of thousands of Syrians have 
relocated from Syria to the KRI due to the conflict that followed the peaceful uprisings against 
Bashar al-Asad’s regime. 
Displacement from Syria peaked in 2013 and 2014, when the number of Syrians in Iraq reached 
200,000. In 2016, Syrian refugees were 250,000; sixty percent of them came from the Syrian region 
of al-Hasaka, twenty five percent from Aleppo, and ten percent from Damascus. Almost all refugees 
are of Kurdish origins and they relocated within KRI. Syrian refugees of Arab background in Iraq (who 
are a few thousand) have relocated in areas different from KRI. For Arab Syrians it was difficult or 
impossible to cross the border with the KRI, due to restrictions both on the Syrian and KRI side of the 
border.7 
The Syrian refugee emergency in KRI has happened in conjunction with the internal displacement 
crisis caused by the expansion of the Islamic State organization and its occupation of parts of 
Nineveh Province in 2014. Even though refugee presence from Syria represents a five percent 
increase of the population in less than three years and overlapped with a daunting domestic 
situation, it has not caused the political or social reactions which often result from mass migration 
such as xenophobia, border closure, or even conflict. 
The thinness of the border between Syria, especially Kurdish Syria, and the KRI has provided the 
conditions for a fast and demographically significant transfer of population followed by a receptive 
response from social and political actors. It follows a boundaries analysis of this phenomenon of 
displacement which illustrates how a thin border has performed under the pressure of a 
humanitarian crisis by facilitating people’s crossing and a receptive social, political, and economic 
response. 
5.1 Political Boundary 
From the point of view of the political boundary, the beginning of the crisis in Syria has caused 
concerns among Kurdish authorities in Iraq. Aware that the Kurdish population of Syria is particularly 
vulnerable, the KRG has attempted to mediate between Kurdish factions in Syria to reach a unified 
Kurdish stance in the interest of security, but also considering the 2011 uprisings as a possibility for 
the realization of at least some of the Kurdish objectives in the country. 
Falah Mustafa, head of the Department for Foreign Relations of the KRG, described the situation as 
follows: 
  
As for the “Arab Spring”, it was people’s demand for a transition to democracy, freedom, 
and rule of law. Syria is an important case for us in the KRG as we share a border and 
therefore their stability and security have direct impact on us. Due to the fact that Syria also 
has a Kurdish population, the transition to democracy in Syria is of significance to us and 
what we want to ensure is that our brothers are given their well-deserved legitimate rights. 
Unfortunately, democracy and stability in Syria were not achieved due to obvious reasons. 
The leadership in Kurdistan Region of Iraq has remained firm on their message to our 
brothers in Syria; to remain united, have a clear vision for their future, and be cautious in 
their stance. (Bakir 2017) 
The Head of Foreign Relations of the KDP Hoshyar Siwaily emphasised the risks related to the nature 
of developments in Syria: 
At the beginning, we saw this as a threat to the Kurds, living in Syria, and that grew 
especially when DAESH/ISIS began to invade many parts of Syrian Kurdistan. Including 
Kobane, as you know, so at the beginning there was a threat, there was not much fighting 
between the Syrian government and the Kurds; still there is not much fight between these 
two parts, the main fighting was between the Kurds and “DAESH”, so at the beginning there 
was no clear position how to react to this situation, but when “DAESH” invaded the area the 
position of KDP and Kurds was clear, which was that “DAESH” was a threat. 
Sadi Ahmed Pire, member of the politburo of the PUK illustrated that Iraqi Kurdish relations with 
Syria have a history, and already on the occasion of clashes between Syrian Kurds and the 
government in Syria of 2004,8 PUK leader Jalal Talabani played a mediation role in the interest of 
Kurdish safety and rights. Also on that occasion a refugee camp for Syrian Kurds was set up on the 
border between Syria and KRI, interestingly Pire claimed that this was “so that the political uprising 
in Syria could be made a political case”. Pire recalls that even before the fall of Saddam, Kurdish 
delegations including Talabani paid visits to Damascus to advocate for Kurdish rights in Syria, 
especially  concerning citizenship and cultural rights (Pire 2017). All political representatives have 
indicated how the Syrian developments have caused both expectations and concerns confirming the 
political interdependence between the two sides of the borders.  
Thus, the KRG has attempted to facilitate the formation of a unified Kurdish stance by convening 
meetings among Syrian Kurdish factions9 known as “Hewler 1” in 2012, (Carnegie Endowment 2012) 
“Hewler 2” in 2013, and “Dohuk 1” in 2014. Committees were formed by representatives of each 
party to deal with different issues relating to the crisis and to establish an increased administrative 
and security presence in the Syrian Kurdish Territory (Pire 2017). Some of the decisions that were 
made concerned the management of the border and its openness for Kurds to cross to Iraq. Another 
controversial decision was the creation of a security force, the Rojava Peshmerga, drawn from the 
Syrian Kurdish refugee population, to be trained militarily and subsequently operate in the Syrian 
Kurdish areas (Siwaily 2017). 
Nevertheless, this mediation effort failed because divisions among Kurdish factions deepened.10 Pire 
of the PUK pointed out that the breaking point was when President Barzani charged a KDP official 
instead of a government representative to deal with relations with Syrian Kurdish groups. This 
reinforced doubts that the KRG’s role in Syria was more directed at expanding KDP influence to this 
area than defending Kurdish interests at large. Eventually, the PYD (Democratic Union Party) secured 
control over most Kurdish areas in Syria and sparked Turkey’s intervention due to its ties with 
Turkey’s enemy PKK.11 The KDP and the KRG had excellent relations with the Turkish government 
and had been at odds with the PYD. As a result, the Rojava Peshmerga were not deployed in Syria, 
  
while the PYD expanded its control over the Syrian Kurdish area through its armed force, the YPG 
(People Protection Unit). The division between the PYD and KDP was also epitomized by the 
intervention of the former in the border area of Sinjar with frequent trespassing on the Iraqi side of 
the border and causing tensions with the KDP and its forces. 
Notwithstanding these political divisions, the KRG and its counterparts in Syria have allowed for a 
relatively smooth border crossing for Kurdish Syrians to Iraq, although on at least two occasions in 
2013 and in 2016 the border was temporarily closed (Glioti 2013, Arafat 2017a) as a retaliatory 
measure towards PYD’s (and PKK’s) operations in Sinjar (International Crisis Group 2017b).12 
Syrian Kurds have been able to cross the border and acquire a fifteen-day visa in KRI while 
undergoing a registration process with the KRI Ministry of Interior. Once obtained clearance from 
the security services Asayish, the refugees have been able to register with UNHCR and have been 
provided with an annually renewable residency permit which is valid only within the KRI. In 2017, 
thirty eight percent of the population was living in the nine purposely-built camps distributed across 
the three provinces of the KRI, the rest settled in private accommodations.13 
Hoshang Mohamed, who at the beginning of the crisis was in charge of humanitarian affairs at the 
KRG Department of Foreign Relations (DFR), explained that:  
At that time, we had less issues because we did not have a financial and economic crisis, and 
even, we would not have help from Baghdad [the Federal Government of Iraq]. So, then, in 
two years, 2012 and 2013, ninety million USD was allocated from KRG's budget to support 
the Syrian refugees. (Mohamed 2017)  
In this initial phase, most of the response to the crisis has been in the hands of provincial 
administrations, especially in Dohuk, the area closer to the border where most refugees arrived. 
Subsequently, the KRG set up the Joint Crisis Coordination Centre under the KRG Ministry of Interior 
in 2014. At this point, the economic situation worsened. As Mohamed recalls:  
In 2014, the budget cut from Baghdad and then the drop in oil prices, the costly war with 
ISIS, and  new influxes of internally displaced people, all of these factors contributed to the 
hardship and worsening of the economic, financial, and security situation; and this has 
affected not only the Syrian refugees, but at that time we also had 1.6 million Iraqi IDPs in 
the KRI. (Mohamed 2017)  
Yet, political and governmental representatives are unanimous in claiming that they were open to 
the arrival of Syrian Kurdish refugees. Siwaily of KDP stated that:  
Kurdistan is the homeland of the Kurds; we are not hosting Kurds only from Syria but also 
from Turkey and Iran. So our borders are open to the Kurds wherever they are and wherever 
they face a threat, and that is what happened with Syria when we opened the border with 
Syria, with Turkey, with Iran, and many Kurds arrived. For example, Makhmour camp, which 
is full of refugees from Turkey. (Siwaily 2017) 
Mustafa of the KRG explained that:  
The KRG, in regard to the displacement of millions of refugees and IDPs, pursued an open-
door policy as we fully understand what it means to be helpless and displaced, having lived 
the experience ourselves. For that reason, we intensified our efforts to ensure welfare and 
the rights of the IDPs and Refugees who sought shelter in our Region, this was done through 
  
facilitating the registration process and their freedom of movement, and also by providing 
residency and work permits. (Bakir 2017) 
Similarly Pire, from the different political perspective of the PUK, was clear in this respect: 
Regarding refugees and political refugees, here we are very open. Because we have 
experienced the same situation before in Iran and in Europe, and many many Peshmerga 
people… I am sure that in every house [of Kurdistan] there was at least one single person as 
a refugee from Turkey or Iran. Therefore, to accept a refugee here, in your house to give 
them a room, is very common. I think… If you had the [number of] refugees that we have 
here now, in Italy you would complain; there is no discussion about that.  
Here, no-one discusses it, it would be very normal if we cut from each person or two, one 
percent… two percent [of income], to provide [for the needs of refugees]. (Pire 2017) 
Thus, the political boundary under the pressure of the Syrian crisis, shows its thinness on multiple 
levels. Firstly, the KRG, Kurdish political groups in Syria and in Iraq have attempted to coordinate a 
response to the crisis thus showing a direct political network across the border. Secondly, the 
response to refugees’ presence was framed within a discourse of transborder Kurdish identity 
between Syria, Iraq, and regionally resonating with pan-Kurdish stances. The memory of a past of 
forced migrations produced a sense of responsibility towards other Kurdish populations and justified 
a response towards the refugees in a political discourse that cuts across different political factions 
and governmental officers. The thinness of the political boundary has allowed for an official stance 
of transborder solidarity to frame a receptive response towards Kurdish refugees from Syria 
although, in other respects, the Kurdish political groups differed sharply and eventually clashed. 
Finally, notwithstanding the political differences between different Kurdish factions, it is important 
to notice that all parties involved have operated across the border also when clashing with each 
other for example in the case of PYD-PKK intervention in the Sinjar area or in KDP’s support for 
friendly factions in Rojava. Such cases further illustrate the thinness of the political boundary.14 
5.2 Social Boundary 
At the social level, border thinness also shapes the dynamics of Syrian displacement in KRI. 
Language, ethnicity, and -to a lesser extent- family relations, have all been mentioned as elements of 
connection between refugees and the host population facilitating a receptive attitude towards the 
displaced. Interviewees have often mentioned the role of family relations. Siwaily for example 
observed: 
The story is that, even during the Ottoman Empire, there was no border between Kurdish 
areas, even Syria did not exist at that time. So, the kind of border control that was imposed 
after the First World War, did limit the movement between these countries. It limited the 
movement of the Kurds between Iran and Iraq, there was great movements especially by 
major tribes, especially in the mountains. After that, the border did limit the movement 
across the borders, but it did not stop the relations because there are families on both sides 
of the countries. […] I do not have any statistics but I myself come from the region of 
Suleymania, on the border between Iran and Iraq and I personally know many people who 
have relatives across the border. So, that did not stop the movement of social relations 
across the border. (Siwaily 2017) 
Speaking of social reactions at the horizontal level Hoshang Mohamed, the head of JCCC, observed 
that: 
  
The public played a very critical role in supporting and accommodating the Syrian refugees, 
we were financially well… in a good shape; and the public contributed with in-kind material, I 
can tell you, when the campaign was started by local NGOs, hundreds of tons of food and 
material were given to refugees. (Mohamed 2017)  
Vian al-Rashed Younes, responsible for external relations of Irbil Governorate has confirmed the 
importance of the ethnic connection: 
In terms of social cohesion this [the Kurdish identity of refugees] has been better, for us. 
Although there have been problems with the education process. For example, I do not know 
who did this, but at some point the international organizations have suggested that 
education should be in Arabic for the Syrian Kurds, and the refugees wanted this, so that 
when they go back they can go back to the local schools.  
I think this has been a mistake; I do not know who is responsible for this, but I think is a 
mistake because if you are a Syrian refugee, say, in Germany, then you would study German. 
So, it should be the same here. Maybe at the secondary education level you could do also 
teach Arabic, but for the elementary level the education should be the local education. 
(Younes 2017) 
This brings to the fore the question of language, mentioned in the previous section. As Al-Rasheed 
points out, it plays an important role in terms of refugees’ “integration”, but from another angle 
language homogeneity is an item on the political agenda of Kurdistan. It shall not surprise then that 
the local administration seems keener on cultivating this element of social and cultural continuity.  
The fact that a social connection between the Iraqi Kurds and Syrians is important is also attested by 
the way in which the international and national response has reacted to Syrian presence. An official 
of a UN agency for example highlighted that: 
the KRG is our natural counterpart for the crisis.  The Federal Government considers the 
crisis primarily a KRG issue, because at the time there was not a single refugee from Syria 
that was out of the KRG. Only a few number of Syrian refugees went south. [This] is because 
of the ethnicity of Syrians. The people that went to Iraq are mostly Syrian Kurds, so there is 
some kind of ethnical connection. So the Syrians that have Arab origins go to other places or 
even other countries, (Jordan, Lebanon…)(Anonymous 2017) 
al-Rasheed made a similar point but from a critical angle: 
The fact that these are Kurdish Syrian refugees meant that both the central government [the 
Federal Government of Iraq] and the international community do not care about this issue. 
We have been to conferences in which states like Lebanon, Turkey, or Jordan received funds 
for their country because of Syrian refugees. We did not benefit as much, but 240,000 
refugees is a big number for three governorates as Erbil, Dohuk, and Suleimaniyya. For the 
same reason, Baghdad [the Federal Government of Iraq] had not helped us with the crisis. 
They don’t care, because they are Kurds. But also about the Arab Syrians… They don’t care. 
(Younes 2017) 
Gathering views from practitioners and policymakers experiencing the Syrian refugee crisis in KRI, 
and seeing it unfold across the border between Syria and Iraq, shows the ways in which the thin 
social boundary plays a role in shaping displacement and its response. Language, ethnic identity, and 
family relations are all factors used to justify, at least rhetorically, a sense of empathy and a 
horizontal connection between refugees and the host population that overrides the divisive capacity 
  
of the formal Syrian-Iraqi border. As a result, not only at the political level were there interests and 
willingness to adopt a receptive stance towards refugees, but also at a social level these decisions 
could be sustained by a perception of common identity, language, and culture between Syrian and 
Iraqi Kurds.  
The identification of Syrian refugees as Kurds is also considered a cause of isolation from other 
regional and domestic dynamics, which privilege the needs and interests of the Arab displaced 
population. This leads to the consideration that, when it comes to social connections, the social 
boundary between Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish regions is thinner than between Kurds and Iraqis; the 
identification of a social Kurdish space engenders a more empathic bond across the Syrian-KRI 
border than between Kurds and Arabs at large. 
5.3 Economic Boundary 
A similar pattern emerges when we consider the economic boundary. As highlighted before, 
transborder economic relations of the KRI represent an important factor in the local and national 
economy, although much of these transactions happen informally and information remains 
approximate. Available trade data (see Figures 1 and 2) illustrate that exports of goods from Syria to 
Iraq has dramatically decreased with the beginning of the crisis in Syria for obvious reasons. Yet, in 
several interviews, the economic nature of transborder relations has appeared as an element 
influencing the dynamics of displacement from Syria, especially as concerns the labour market. 
Already before the beginning of the crisis, KRI was a destination for Syrians and Syrian Kurds in 
particular, who could benefit economically by doing business with this oil-rich region or providing 
labour force. Syrians have a reputation of hard-working individuals. According to the head of the 
IOM Office of Dohuk: “There have been many Syrian workers working in Iraq before. They are 
considered hard workers and they have a good reputation for this, they are employed in sectors 
such as food, construction, carpentry and sweets-making, for example.” (Haso 2017) 
Hoshyar Siwali of the KDP confirms that even before 2011 “they [Syrian Kurds] were coming here, 
but not to the extent, of course, which we have seen after 2011, when the civil war broke out. But 
there was that kind of movement.” (Siwaily 2017) 
This is indicative of how the thin economic boundary between Syria and KRI has constituted a 
pattern for Syrian Kurds to relocate to KRI after 2011. The KRG has not interfered with the possibility 
of Syrians working in KRI, allowing them to access the local labour market. Access to the job market 
happens informally, but on several occasions, it was confirmed to the author that informality is the 
norm also for the autochthonous population. Refugees’ integration in the local labour market is even 
surprising to an extent. In the governorate of Dohuk, which hosts the majority of the refugees, 
seventy-five percent of the male adult refugee population is employed. This figure is even higher 
than the employment rate of the local population. (UNHCR 2016, 31) 15 
In a conversation, Omer Khider, Head of Research of Irbil Chamber of Commerce and Industry, has 
claimed that Syrian refugees have become part of the local workforce and their integration is more 
successful than the integration of internally displaced Iraqis. A survey that the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industries carried out with one hundred companies and commercial activities 
operating in KRI shed light on the nature of the economic integration of refugees in the KRI. 
According to the survey, eighty percent of the employers find the skills of refugees and IDPs 
matching their needs. Yet, the remaining twenty percent who is unsatisfied with the skills of the 
employees indicates that the main reason to exclude IDPs from employment is language. According 
to eighty six percent of the surveyed population, language is an obstacle for the employment of 
  
IDPs. Other obstacles for the employment of IDPs relate to the fact that many are not provided with 
residency permits and do not have security clearance by the Kurdish security forces, thus making 
their employment more unlikely. (Adbulla and Khyder 2016, 6-8)16 Finally, asked about the perceived 
impact on security of IDPs and refugees sixty eight percent of the interviewees have declared that 
they see IDPs as negatively impacting on security, while only twenty eight percent considered 
refugees as having a negative impact on security in Kurdistan.  
In addition to the exchange of labour relations across the economic boundary, the importance of 
smuggling as an informal economic phenomenon was previously mentioned. This aspect has also 
occasionally emerged in some interviews. Sadi Pire of the PUK has for example observed that 
“smuggling across the border by Semelka from the PKK and KDP smugglers is actually wonderful 
because every part has a benefit from it. The loser is the KRG because they cannot control [it].” (Pire 
2017) Bahjat Bashir of KDP-Syria (Al-Party), reports that human trafficking and smuggling of refugees 
to Iraq has become a profitable economic activity. (Bashir 2017) Other sources indicate that the 
economic relations between Rojava Kurdistan in Syria and the KRI have been flourishing due to 
business and real estate value fluctuations in Syria during the conflict. Hisham Arafat, a journalist 
operating in Rojava Kurdistan during the crisis, observes that the establishment of a new crossing 
directly between Syria and KRI has revived economic relations, and the KRI has become a key source 
of primary goods, especially in the construction sector for companies operating in Kurdish Syria. 
(Arafat 2017a) The importance of trade between KRI and Rojava has increased at times in which IS 
occupied areas cut out Kurdish areas from the main economic centres of Syria, such as Aleppo and 
Damascus; once IS has been removed from these areas the crossing of Faysh Khabour has become 
less busy although still relevant. (Arafat 2017b) 
The intense exchange of labour force, its relatively successful integration in the local economic 
context, and the advantage that Syrian Kurds enjoy over Iraqi IDPs are indicators of how at times of 
multiple humanitarian emergencies, the thinness of the economic boundary between Syria and the 
Iraqi Kurds areas has influenced the modes of displacement and the response of the local society 
and administration.  Refugees benefitted from their employability in KRI, while local government and 
private sector capitalized on the increased supply in labour and the possibility to integrate these 
workers through culture, language, and security perceptions into the local market. 
5.4 Natural Boundary 
A final consideration should be mentioned with regard to the natural boundary between Syria and 
Iraqi Kurdish areas. The obstacle of border-crossing due to the presence of the river Tigris on the 
border has been, at least in part bypassed, with the building of an artificial pontoon to allow for the 
easier transition across the border. According to Arafat, Faysh Khabur has never been an official 
crossing point and has only become semi-official between KRI and “Rojava” recently (Arafat 2017b) 
(Arafat 2017a). On the 16 January 2013, at a time in which Syrian displacement to Iraq was growing 
steadily, the pontoon bridge was built allowing for faster transfer of goods and people. This has 
modified the natural boundary between the two areas facilitating cross-border activities. 
These considerations show how the modes of displacement and its local response have been 
influenced by the character of the social, political, economic, and natural boundaries constitutive of 
the Syrian-KRI border. A thin border has provided the conditions for a fast transfer of a considerable 
amount of people across the border and a receptive response to their presence in KRI. Social, 
political, and economic aspects have converged in softening the divisive capacity of the Syrian-Iraqi 
border of Kurdistan. Notwithstanding sharp divergences, political groups could “frame” their 
receptive stance towards refugees into a narrative of responsibility towards other Kurds. At the 
  
social level, language homogeneity and a shared memory of forced displacement, provided a 
connection that facilitated integration and social cohesion. Economically, Kurdish Syrians matched 
Iraqi Kurdish labour demands and enjoyed the advantage of higher trust and language over Iraqi 
IDPs. All these aspects converged also at the level of the natural boundary that was modified to 
facilitate people and goods transfer across the border. 
6 Conclusions 
Initially, it was observed that categories that represent politics and society, as contained into a linear 
representation of state borders, do not provide satisfactory analytical depth for the complexity of 
phenomena such as forced migrations. Thus, border thinness has been proposed to rethink borders 
as constituted by layers which, to different extents, determine their containment capacity. The 
analysis of each of the boundaries of the border between Syria and Iraqi Kurdish regions has 
highlighted the web of relations which cuts across these states.  This led to the assessment that 
there is a space of shared relations between Syrian and Iraqi Kurds, which transcends Iraqi and 
Syrian territoriality and renders this border thin.  
The forced displacement of Syrians to Iraqi Kurdistan has generated dynamics that reflect the 
thinness of the border. The views of local policymakers, administrators, and humanitarian operators 
highlight, at least rhetorically, the convergence of a sense of political responsibility, social solidarity, 
and economic interests to address the humanitarian question posed by Kurdish refugees’ presence. 
This convergence has been made possible by the relational space between Syria and Iraq and has 
produced the conditions “to frame”17 in public discourse a receptive stance towards Syrian refugees 
in KRI. A thin border between Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish areas has been a way to mitigate the 
containment capacity of national territorialities in contrast with Kurdish identity and reinforce the 
idea of a Kurdish unified space. 
A counterfactual consideration is that for Arab Syrians, crossing the border with KRI has been a 
difficult or impossible task; while for internally displaced Iraqis their relocation to KRI was met with 
obstacles such as language, security concerns, and limitations to their possibility of leaving the 
camps where they have been hosted18. One interviewee working for a humanitarian organization 
even claimed that “it’s almost a running joke among practitioners: in KRI refugees are treated as 
IDPs and IDPs as refugees.”19 This epitomizes how the situation of Syrian Kurdish refugees is 
influenced by the nature of its relations to KRI while, paradoxically, other internally displaced Iraqis 
had to experience forms of bordering and isolation because of their disconnection from the Kurdish 
social and political space. Consistently with the political objectives of the KRG, the response of the 
refugee crisis compared to the IDP crisis is indicative of a thinning of the Kurdish border between 
Syria and Iraq, but border practices between KRI and the rest of Iraq have become more 
discriminative and selective making this border “thicker”.20  
Rethinking borders in the terms presented in this study does not lead to the conclusion that they are 
in decline, redundant, or obsolete. Instead, it is their nature, quality, and function that change. As it 
was seen, the Syrian-Iraqi border was closed at times, and groups such as Arabs or young males 
were subject to higher scrutiny or discrimination, so even a thin border retains a “filtering” function 
(Lynch and Brand 2017).  
Limitedly to the historical and social context under analysis then, reconceptualising borders in a way 
that departs from a Westphalian ideal type, provides a more thorough analytical perspective on 
dynamics of migration which are otherwise ignored by views that rely solely on state territoriality as 
unit of analysis. Society, politics, and economics seldom end in the same place where state 
  
territoriality ends; instead they can continue as a fabric of relations, interactions, and therefore 
spaces that establish patterns for transborder dynamics of migrations.  
7 Policy Considerations 
This study calls for greater awareness from policymakers of the historical nature of borders, their 
multilayered structure, and their variable degree of containment capacity of displacement and their 
effective capacity to regulate people movement.  
Border thinness can be operationalized as a qualitative analytical category to develop scenarios of 
modes and intensities of displacement and anticipate the responses that these may generate in 
receiving states. Where migrations or forced displacements take place across thin borders, more 
receptive attitudes can be plausibly expected, while the intensity and speed of displacement will be 
higher. Conversely, thick borders which have greater capacity of containment, are likely to generate 
more hostile attitudes towards migratory phenomena. 
Awareness of these trends can facilitate policy design that is more receptive towards the 
particularity of local realities and thus avoids “one-size-fits-all” approaches.  On the basis of this 
conceptualization of borders, Operators in the humanitarian sectors, can develop more accurate 
representations of networks and relations that influence displacement dynamics by relying on a 
model that goes beyond generic assumptions of state territoriality.   
For example, while most maps represent space as mainly divided by state borders; this analysis has 
shown that displacement moves along patterns that rely on different relational networks which 
consequently inform the decisions of the host state towards the displaced population. These aspects 
are seldom represented in maps or reported in textual analyses which instead rely on a linear 
representation of state borders as the main unit of space partition. The concept of border thinness 
may be a way to develop alternative or complementary representations of space which can 
represent with greater accuracy the role of borders in situations of displacement and their effect in 
shaping people’s movement .
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